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Abstract The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate about the electoral rules in Italy.
In particular, we simulate some voting rules to test what is the best electoral system on the basis
of a utility function that takes into account two indices — representativeness and governability.
As long as governability is important, a mixed member system (75% ﬁrst-past-the-post, 25%
proportional representation) outperforms the others. Our tool is the software ALEX4.1.
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1. Introduction
In the last twenty years the issue of institutional reforms has played an important role
in the Italian political debate (Padovano and Ricciuti 2008). The Executive and the
Parliament did not see their structure and relevant powers changed, but changes in the
voting rule took place. The Parliament is bicameral: the Camera dei Deputati — the
Lower Chamber — has 630 legislators elected by all citizens over eighteen years old,
while the Senato — the Upper Chamber — has 315 legislators elected by voters over
twenty-ﬁveyearsold.1 Bothhousesshareexactlythesamepower. Theelectoralsystem
changed once in 46 years,2 and since then has changed twice in 13 years. From 1948
to 1993 the Lower Chamber was elected in relatively large multi member districts by
proportional representation (PR) with D’Hondt rule. The Upper Chamber was elected
on the basis of small constituencies but seats were assigned proportionally according
to the regional results. Since this system provided rather unstable governments, in
1993 a referendum was called to transform the Upper House voting rule to ﬁrst-past-
the-post for 258 over 315 seats. The referendum achieved 82.7% of votes in favour
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of the change, and subsequently the Parliament passed a bill stating that 75% of the
seats of the Lower Chamber had to be elected with the ﬁrst-pass-the-post system in
single-member districts, while the remaining 25% had to be elected on the basis of
nationwide proportional representation with a 4% threshold. For the Upper House no
competing lists were considered, but still there was a mechanism aimed at reducing the
effects of plurality.
In 2005 the electoral system was changed again and the current voting rule was
applied. The coalition of lists obtaining the majority of votes receives at least 55% of
the seats in the Lower Chamber, and there is a 2% threshold. In the Upper Chamber
55% of seats are given to the coalition winning at the regional level. This system
has been widely criticised: it tends to increase the number of parties, and therefore,
political fragmentation with negative effects on government stability. Furthermore,
lists are closed.3 In light of this criticism, the political arena is currently discussing
several proposals to further reform the electoral rules.
In this paper we use the software ALEX4.1 (Bissey and Ortona 2007) to simulate
the effects of a number of possible reforms on political representation, on the basis of
the results of the 2006 elections. In particular, we focus on ﬁrst-past-the-post (FPTP),
proportional representation (PR), run-off, mixed plurality-proportional representation
(MM1 and MM2), PR with several thresholds, PR with small districts.
The paper does not aim at simulating the results of the next elections since the po-
litical landscape has changed since 2006.4 Rather, we study what could have happened
in 2006 under different voting rules.5 For simplicity, we concentrate on the Camera
dei Deputati: seats in the Senate are given on a regional basis and therefore we should
have applied all the voting systems simulated here to 20 regions each time. We believe
that the value added of this exercise is not enough to compensate the computational
costs.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 is devoted to the description of the
data and the hypotheses we base our simulations on. The simulated voting rules are
discussed in Section 3. Results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 is dedicated to a
brief discussion about Condorcet and Borda. A comparison of possible reforms with
the current voting rule is outlined in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. An appendix gives
some details on the parties and a summary of the Italian electoral system over time.
2. Hypotheses
ALEX4.1 requires a number of inputs (in brackets, the ﬁgures assumed here):
(i) the number of voters in each constituency (100);
(ii) the size of the Parliament (630, as for real);
3 At the time of writing this paper signatures were collected to call for three referendums aimed at changing
the law. The referendums took place in June 2009 but did not passed the 50% plus one voter threshold in
order to be valid. The ﬁrst and the second had given 55% of seats to the list obtaining the majority of votes
at the Camera and Senato, respectively. The third had prevented candidature in more than one district.
4 The centre-right coalition (excluding UDC) won elections in 2008.
5 However, different voting rules change the supply of parties, since they change their incentives.
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(iii) the number of parties (9);
(iv) the nation-wide share of votes of each party;
(v) the probability that the second preferred party is next to the ﬁrst preferred on
the left-right axis (0.8, the default value), and the probability that it is a second
next party (0.1 by default). These probabilities are employed to provide the full
ordering of preferences needed to simulate Borda Count and Condorcet Winner
for parties of every voter, through a random-number device;
(vi) the location of each party on the left-to-right axis;
(vii) the concentration of parties – if it is the case (as in our simulation).
Table 1. Basic data
% Votes in 2006 ID c n
RC+Pdci 8.4 10 1.35 58
Verdi 2.2 17 1.53 50
Ulivo 33.0 34 1.38 62
RnP 2.7 38 1.52 35
Udeur+IdV 3.8 48 1.72 158
UDC+DC 7.8 60 1.45 46
FI 24.5 74 1.30 17
AN 12.8 81 1.44 46
LN 4.8 86 2.22 142
Table 1 shows the main data we use in our simulations. In the ﬁrst column we
report the votes obtained in the 2006 general elections, with some re-arrangements:
we sum two far left parties (RC and Pdci), two centrist parties belonging to the centre-
left coalition (Udeur and IdV), and two centrist parties belonging to the centre-right
coalition (UDC and DC) in order to simplify the computations. In the second column
we measure the ideological distance on a left-to-right scale in the range 1–100.6 Last
two columns are concerned with party concentration and the number of seats in which
each party is concentrated. We assume that a party is concentrated in a constituency if
the share of votes for that party is at least 1.2 times the national share. In this case, we








where Jid = number of seats in the constituency d where party i is concentrated; qid =
electoral result of the party i in the constituency d divided by the national electoral
result; D = number of constituencies where party i is concentrated.7
6 Data come from a re-arrangement of the “expert survey” by Benoit and Laver (2006). We are grateful to
the authors for the permission to use them.
7 As an example, LN is concentrated in 8 constituencies (Piemonte II, Lombardia I, II and III, Veneto I and
II, Friuli – Venezia Giulia and Sicilia II), then D = 8.
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We consider the value 2/3 because ALEX4.1 only allows for one concentrated party in
each seat. The sum of seats (if we consider as concentrated each seats of the concen-
trated constituency) where all the parties are concentrated would be more than 900.8 If
we sum equation (2) for all the parties å
9
i=1ni we reduce this number to 614 (< 630).
On the basis of basic data reported in Table 1, we simulate different electoral sys-
tems and evaluate each voting rule by means of two indices — representativeness and
governability. Representativeness is deﬁned as the distance with the respect to the one-
district PR system — a voting rule that gives an almost one-to-one conversion of votes









where Sji is the number of seats obtained by party i with the voting system j, Sppi is
the number of seats obtained by party i under One-District PR, Sui is the number of
seats that party i has in case of maximum disproportionality (i.e., the case in which the
largest party in the One-District PR gets all the seats).
Governability is based on the number of crucial parties (i.e., those who would
destroy the government majority if they withdrew), and on the number of seats of the
majority. It is given by:
Gj = A+B, (4)
where A = 1/(C +1), where C is the number of crucial parties in the government,






, where n is the number of seats above the majority level,9
m is the total number of seats, and C is the total number of crucial parties. Crucial
parties are deﬁned along the political coalitions we use here, and not according to the
minimum winning coalitions.
How to use these indices to compare the performance of different systems? When
a system is either dominant among a set of systems (i.e., it enjoys the highest levels of
both representativeness and governability), or dominated by one of them, the solution
is trivial. The former is the best system while the latter is ruled out. When a trade-off
between the two dimensions arises, we have to establish a criterion to decide which
one is the most relevant. A possible solution is to introduce a social utility function:
U = GaRb, (5)
where G = index of governability and R = index of representativeness. The relative
importance of the two main dimensions is represented by the ratio a/b.10 When its
8 For a seat where k parties are present, k−1 parties could be concentrated.
9 Half the number of seats plus one if the number of seats is even; half the number of seats plus 0.5 if it is
odd.
10 Actually, the ratio of partial elasticities may be considered a proxy for the relative weight that the commu-
nity assigns to relative increase in the value of G and R. This is the main reason to choose a Cobb-Douglas
form. See Fragnelli et al. (2005) for a broader discussion.
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value is higher than 1, governability is more relevant than representativeness and vice
versa. Obviously, the system with the highest value of U is the best one (for a further
discussion and some empirical applications, see Ortona et al. 2008).
3. The simulated electoral systems
In this section we analyse what would have happened under different electoral systems.
In particular, we simulate the Italian Parliament under:
(i) One-District Proportionality — the seats are assigned on the basis of the shares
of votes in the population. This is the voting rule used in The Netherlands (but
for minor differences), used as a reference to compare the other systems.
(ii) Run-off Majority — in each district, the two parties that obtain most votes enter
the second round, where the one with most votes wins. If a party has at least
50% of the votes in the ﬁrst round, it wins the seat and the second round is not
necessary.
(iii) First-Past-the-Post — in each district, the seats are assigned to the candidate
with most votes. This is the voting rule used in UK.
(iv) Mixed Member I (without subtraction) — part of the seats are assigned through
the First–Past–the–Post system and the rest on the basis of the proportional rep-
resentation. In our simulationwe assign 25% of the seats through proportionality
and 75% through plurality.
(v) Mixed Member II (with subtraction) — again, part of the seats are assigned
through proportionality and the rest through plurality, but the number of votes
needed to elect one MP in the First-Past-the-Post part is subtracted from the lists
in the PR part, making the voting rule more proportional. We assign 25% of the
seats through proportionality and 75% through plurality. This system is a proxy
of the Italian electoral system from 1993 to 2005.11
For First-Past-the-Post, Mixed Member I and Mixed Member II we consider the possi-
bility of strategic voting: most voters whose preferred party has no chance of winning
will probably either abstain or vote for the second (third, etc.) preferred party. Hence
what must be introduced is the possibility for the voter either to vote for a would-be
winner or to vote for the preferred party. This is done through a probability, p. If the
probability is 0, the voter will remain faithful to its preferred party; if it is 1, she will
vote for the largest party of the coalition that party belongs to, also to be deﬁned by the
user. If 0 < p < 1, the value of p is used to produce the choices of every voter, through





11 For the two mixed member systems “contamination effects” (Cox and Schoppa 2002) are possible across
the two systems, but we are unable to deal with this issue.
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where 0 ≤ L ≤ 100 is the distance between the preferred party and the largest party
of the coalition (values are obtained from the ideological distance in Table 1), and k
is a weighting parameter. We consider two values of k, 0 (which maximises strategic
voting) and 5, which makes a modest strategic voting.12
(i) Threshold Proportionality — parties with a percentage of votes lower than the
established threshold are excluded. The seats are distributes among the remain-
ing parties through proportional representation. In our simulations threshold is
ﬁxed at 3%, 4%, or 5% (the voting rule used in Germany).
(ii) Proportional Representation (with small districts) — the voting rule used in
Spain. It is based on small districts, which make the competition centred upon
the two main parties, or strong regional parties. The number of representatives
per district ranges from 1 to 34, with an average of 7. In the small districts the
two main parties or strong regional parties get seats. The few large districts al-
low some representation for small non regional parties. According to Rae and
Ram´ ırez (1993), “...the system regulates the competition among parties in order
to allow for the continuity of the opposition, it leaves room for to multiple voices
in the Parliament and, however, it provides the strongest national party with the
opportunity to govern and have to answer for its actions before the electorate.”
ALEX4.1 does not allow for districts of different magnitude. Therefore, we run
three simulations with 5, 7 and 10 representatives per district in order to mimic
the Spanish system.
4. Results
In this section we report the results obtained through the simulations. To help reading
the tables we draw a dotted line between the centre-left and the centre-right coalitions.
Tables also report the indices of G and R for each parliament.
Table 2 reports the results of One-District PR, Run-off and First-Past-the-Post. We
can notice that First-Past-the-Post strongly polarises political representation. Under
maximum strategic voting (k = 0) the centre-right gets a small majority, whereas when
we reduce the level of strategic voting (k = 5) the same coalition gets a large majority.
FI can even support the government alone, and this gives a large G. The Run-off also
strongly reduces the number of parties in the Parliament, with the centre-right coalition
obtaining a small majority.
ResultsforthetwomajoritariansystemsarecomparedwithOne-DistrictPR.Clearly,
all parties are represented in this Parliament, at the expense of the main ones. By deﬁ-
nition R is equal to one, and governability is quite low, because the resulting centre-left
government has only a majority seat.
In Table 3 we present results for the two mixed systems. In these two systems the
centre-right coalition always wins the elections. As in the First-Past-the-Post scenario,
12 Simulations with higher values of k did not produce substantially different results.
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a decrease in the level of strategic voting leads to a rise in the seats for FI and a reduc-
tion for Ulivo. This is due to the fact that FI is near to AN and not so far from UDC +
DC and LN, while Ulivo is far from RC + PdCI.
Table 2. One-District PR, Run-off Majority and FPTP with strategic voting
One-District PR Run-off Majority
First-Past-the-Post
k = 0 k = 5
RC + Pdci 53 1 1 0
Verdi 14 0 0 0
Ulivo 208 299 307 236
RnP 17 0 0 0
Udeur + IdV 24 0 0 0
UDC + DC 49 3 7 0
FI 154 287 271 347
AN 81 40 44 47
LN 30 0 0 0
R 1 0.469 0.488 0.476
G 0.167 0.341 0.252 0.623
Majority
Centre-Left Centre-Right Centre-Right Centre-Right
(316) (330) (322) (394)
Table 3. Mixed Member I and II with strategic voting (75% FPTP, 25% PR)
Mixed Member I Mixed Member II
k = 0 k = 5 k = 0 k = 5
RC + Pdci 14 13 2 19
Verdi 4 4 0 4
Ulivo 282 229 304 231
RnP 4 4 0 2
Udeur + IdV 6 6 0 6
UDC + DC 17 12 6 14
FI 242 298 279 300
AN 53 56 39 48
LN 8 8 0 6
R 0.616 0.609 0.476 0.600
G 0.201 0.591 0.337 0.582
Majority
Centre-Right Centre-Right Centre-Right Centre-Right
(320) (374) (324) (368)
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Table 4. Threshold Proportionality
3% 4% 5%
RC + Pdci 55 58 61
Verdi 0 0 0
Ulivo 219 228 241
RnP 0 0 0
Udeur + IdV 25 0 0
UDC + DC 52 54 57
FI 162 169 179
AN 85 88 93
LN 32 33 0
R 0.927 0.869 0.797




Table 4 reports the results for simulations of the PR system with some thresholds.
The results are quite different as long as the thresholds change. For example, with
the three percent threshold, all parties but two are represented in the Parliament, with
the ﬁve percent threshold only ﬁve parties get representatives. Representativeness is
always quite high, and governability increases with higher thresholds.
Table 5. Proportional Representation with small districts
5 MPs 7 MPs 10 MPs
RC + Pdci 12 19 48
Verdi 0 0 0
Ulivo 283 288 258
RnP 0 0 0
Udeur + IdV 0 9 16
UDC + DC 9 12 34
FI 218 192 189
AN 84 90 71
LN 24 20 14
R 0.664 0.699 0.799
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Table 5 reports the results we obtained mimicking the Spanish system. The system
gives a clear advantage to the two main parties. Moving from 5 to 10 MPs per district
this edge is reduced, and almost all parties receive some representation. Note that a
strongly regional base such as LN sees the number of its MPs reduced as long as the
district magnitude increases. The opposite happens for parties that are more homoge-
neously represented, such as UDC + DC and RC + Pdci. Representativeness is quite
high, but governability is not: although the main parties are very large, they still need
to make alliances in order to make a government. The centre-right coalition prevails
with the lowest district magnitude, whereas the centre-left will govern under the two
other simulations (only by one seat with 7 MPs district magnitude).
5. A comparison with the current electoral system
It is interesting to compare the current system (proportional with majority top-up for
the coalition that obtains the largest number of votes) with possible other voting rules.
Table 6 reports the distribution of seats after the 2006 general election, and provides
the indices we have calculated for the other voting rules. In Table 7 we select the best
electoral system on the basis of the ratio a/b.
Table 6. Seats distribution and indices under the current voting rule
Seats




Udeur + IdV 26









Which is the best system? We consider two different scenarios — the case where
citizens use the maximum level of strategic voting (k = 0) and the case where voters
use a lower level of strategic voting (k = 5).
In the ﬁrst scenario, according to our indices of G and R, First-Past-the-Post, Mixed
Member I and Proportional with 7 small districts are always dominated by other sys-
tems. The situation is really different in the second scenario (k = 5). According to our
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indices G and R, Run-off Majority, Mixed Member II and Proportional with 7 small
districts are always dominated by other systems. We compare the goodness of the
systems through the utility function (5). From Section 2, we know that the choice of
the best electoral system depends on the value of the ratio a/b. Results are reported
in Table 7. These results can be easily interpreted considering the trade-off between
representativeness: for small values of a (the weight of governability in equation 5),
the best system is the one that gives an almost 1:1 relationship between votes and seats
(One-District PR). As long as a increases with respect to b, preference is given to less
representative systems. For extreme weight of governability the First-Past-the-Post
succeeds. Given a less than perfect strategic voting, the Mixed Member I seems the
best electoral system. The current system performs quite well under pure strategic vot-
ing, but just a small deviation from it shows that if governability is deemed important,
then Mixed Member I prevails (on mixed systems see Shugart and Wattenberg 2001).
This can at least partially explain why this system is so criticised.
Table 7. Choice of the best system I
a/b Preferred system
k = 0
< 0.139 One-District PR
> 0.139 PR with majority top-up
k = 5
< 0.139 One-District PR
∈ (0.139,0.75) PR with majority top-up
∈ (0.75,4.673) Mixed Member I
> 4.673 First-Past-the-Post
6. A discussion on Condorcet winner and Borda count
This section is devoted to the results from two famous electoral systems that can be
simulated using ALEX4.1: Condorcet winner and Borda count.13 Their relevance for
theoretical issues makes it worthwhile deserving a section to them.
Both Borda count and Condorcet winner require the full ordering of preferences
for parties of every voter. ALEX4.1 provides it through a random-number device by
using the probability that the second preferred party is next to the ﬁrst preferred on the
left-right axis and the probability that it is a second next party — set at the beginning
by the user.
13 According to Borda count each voter is asked to rank the list of parties. For each party is assigned 1
point to the ﬁrst preferred party, 2 points to the second party and so on. The points obtained by each party
are summed up for each district. The winner is the party with the smallest sum. Condorcet winner is the
party that is preferred by the majority when confronted in pairs to all the other parties. Then, if we have this
scenario, the assignment of the seat is straightforward. If we have a cycle, the winner is the party with the
highest number of vote in the district.
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In our simulation (Table 8) Borda count assigns a very large number of seats to
UDEUR and IdV, which seems unreasonable. This is due to the fact that this is a
consensus-based rather than a majoritarian electoral system. This implies that, as in
our scenario, it may result into the election of a broadly acceptable but not preferred
party. In Condorcet winner, the importance of the central party is reduced with respect
to Borda, while the number of seats for large parties increases.
If we add Condorcet winner and Borda count parameters to choose the best elec-
toral system (Table 9), we ﬁnd that the latter performs better than the actual system
if governability becomes relevant when voters act fully strategically and it crowds out
First-Past-the-Post when k = 5. On the other hand, Condorcet winner is never the
preferred system.
Table 8. Condorcet winner and Borda count
Condorcet winner Borda count




Udeur + IdV 103 310









Table 9. Choice of the best system II
a/b Preferred system
k = 0
< 0.139 One-District PR
∈ (0.139,1.609) PR with majority top-up
> 1.609 Borda Count
k = 5
< 0.139 One-District PR
∈ (0.139,0.75) PR with majority top-up
∈ (0.75,3.754) Mixed Member I
> 3.754 Borda Count
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7. Conclusions
This paper provides a set of simulations for the Italian electoral system that could be
useful for the current debate. First, we show that there is not a system that dominates
the others. The choice about the best electoral system depends on the preferences about
the two dimensions we considered — representativeness and governability. Second,
we ﬁnd that as long as governability is more important than representativeness, the
Mixed Member I tends to prevail. Interestingly, the centre-right tends to win more
often than the centre-left, although in the 2006 election the centre-left won by a tiny
majority. This can be caused by at least two reasons: ﬁrst, the ideological distance
between the parties that constitute the centre-left coalition is higher than among those
of the centre-right, and under non perfect strategic voting this will mean that a higher
percentage of centre-left voters would abstain or vote non-strategically (abstention is
not contemplated in the software). Second, the centre-left coalition is constituted by
a very large party (Ulivo) and smaller allies, and these small parties are often unable
to get represented under alternative voting rules. A reorganisation of the centre-left
coalition seems therefore needed.
Acknowledgment We wish to thank Alessandro Chiaramonte, Roberto D’Alimonte,
Carlo Fusaro, Gian Luigi Galeotti, Giovanni Guzzetta, Guido Ortona and two anony-
mous referees for useful comments.
References
Benoit, K. and Laver, M. (2006). Party Policies in Modern Democracies, mimeo.
Bissey, M. E. and Ortona, G. (2007). The Program for the Simulation of Electoral
Systems ALEX4.1: What It Does and How to Use It. University of Eastern Piedmont,
Department of Public Policy and Public Choice, Working Paper No. 91.
Cox, K. E. and Schoppa, L. J. (2002). Interaction Effects in Mixed-Member Electoral
Systems: Theory and Evidence from Germany, Japan, and Italy. Comparative Political
Studies, 35, 1027–1057.
Fragnelli, V., Monella, G. and Ortona, G. (2005). A Simulative Approach for Evaluat-
ing Electoral Systems. Homo Oeconomicus, 22(4), 525–549.
Ortona, G., Ottone S. and Ponzano, F. (2008). A Simulative Assessment of the Italian
Electoral System. In Padovano, F. and Ricciuti, R. (eds.), Italian Institutional Reforms:
A Public Choice Perspective. Heidelberg, Springer. PAGES
Padovano, F. and Ricciuti, R. (2008). Italian Institutional Reforms: A Public Choice
Perspective. Heidelberg, Springer.
Rae, D. and Ram´ ırez, V. (1993). El Sistema Electoral Espa˜ nol, Madrid, McGraw-Hill.
Shugart, M. S. and Wattenberg, M. P. (2001). Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. The
Best of Both Worlds? New York, Oxford University Press.
AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 3, no. 3 303S. Ottone, F. Ponzano, R. Ricciuti
Appendix A1. Parties
The Italian political system is centred around two coalitions: centre-right (including
AN, FI, LN, UDC + DC) and centre-left (Udeur + IdV, RnP, Verdi, Ulivo, RC + Pdci).
AN Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance)
FI Forza Italia (Go Italy!)
LN Lega Nord (Northern League)
UDC + DC Unione Democratica Cristiana + Democrazia Cristiana
Udeur + IdV Unione democratica per l’Europa + Italia dei Valori
RnP Rosa nel Pugno (Rose in the Fist) — alliance between Italian
Socialists and Democrats (SDI) and Italian Radicals
Verdi Green Party
Ulivo
Olive Tree — alliance between Democrats of the Left (DS) and
Democracy is Freedom (DL)
RC + Pdci
Rifondazione comunista (Communist Refoundation) + Partito dei
comunisti italiani (Italian Communists’ Party)
Appendix A2. The Italian electoral system over time
Period
Electoral system



















sentation with 2% threshold and
with majority top-up (55%)
Region-based Proportional rep-
resentation with majority top-up
(55%)
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